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Abstract: Environmental agencies have several options for dealing with 
alleged noncompliance with environmental regulations. These options 
include pursuit of administrative or judicial civil penalties and injunctions 
to prevent future violations. Scholars have begun exploring whether these 
options induce better performance by regulated entities. This Article ad-
dresses a largely neglected question: whether a regulated facility’s charac-
teristics affect the efficacy of the different enforcement options. The Arti-
cle stems from a study of compliance by the chemical industry with 
federal Clean Water Act permits. It assesses whether facility characteris-
tics, including effluent limit level and type, permit modifications, facility 
size, capacity utilization, discharge volatility, and ownership structure, 
theoretically should make a difference and actually appeared to do so at 
the facilities covered by the study. The findings should be of interest to 
both facilities regulated under the Clean Water Act and federal and state 
regulators seeking to maximize the impact of their enforcement actions. 
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Introduction 
 In October 2007, the U.S. Senate approved by unanimous con-
sent a “sense of the Senate” resolution commemorating the thirty-fifth 
anniversary of the adoption of the federal Clean Water Act (CWA).1 
The resolution noted the tremendous value and importance of clean 
water to the United States; the substantial improvements in water 
quality that have resulted from a partnership among government, the 
private sector, and the public; the “resounding public support for the 
continued protection” of the nation’s surface water bodies; the link 
between maintenance and improvement of water quality and protec-
tion of the public health and wildlife; and the availability of abundant 
opportunities for public recreation and economic development.2 The 
resolution sounded a cautionary note, indicating that “water pollution 
problems persist throughout the United States, and significant chal-
lenges lie ahead in the effort to protect and restore the water re-
sources of the United States.”3 It also enumerated the portions of the 
nation’s surface waters that remain impaired.4 Nevertheless, the Sen-
ate invited all citizens and all levels of government to “celebrate the 
accomplishments of the United States” and “recommit to achieving” 
the statutory goals of restoration and maintenance of “the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the waters of the United States.”5
 Amidst all the mirth and revelry, there was one notable omission: 
the resolution made no reference to either compliance with or en-
forcement of the provisions of the CWA.6 The omission is trouble-
some because recent reports reveal that noncompliance rates with the 
CWA are disturbingly high. According to a report by the U.S. Public 
Interest Research Group (PIRG) Information Fund issued in the same 
month in which the Senate adopted its laudatory CWA resolution, 
more than 3600 major facilities---fifty-seven percent of the total num-
ber of such regulated facilities---exceeded their CWA permits at least 
                                                                                                                      
1 S. Res. 354, 110th Cong. (2007). The CWA is the current name of the statute 
adopted in 1972 called the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments. Clean Wa-
ter Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000 & Supp. 2005) (originally enacted as Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816). 
2 S. Res. 354, 110th Cong. (2007). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
6 S. Res. 354, 110th Cong. (2007). Three days before adoption of the Senate resolu-
tion, the House passed a similar resolution. H.R. Res. 725, 110th Cong. (2007). It too omit-
ted any reference to compliance or enforcement. Id. 
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once during calendar year 2005.7 More than 600 facilities exceeded 
their permit limits for at least half of the monthly reporting periods 
during 2005, and, on average, the facilities reporting violations dis-
charged more than four times the amounts allowed by their permits.8 
Despite the frequency with which CWA permit violations occurred, 
the total budget of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
fell by 13%, adjusted for inflation, between 1997 and 2006.9 During 
the same period, EPA’s enforcement funding fell by 5%.10 Enforce-
ment funds for the Agency’s regional offices, which carry most of the 
enforcement load under the CWA, fell by 8%.11 The result of these 
funding cuts was a decline in regional enforcement staffing of about 
5%.12 Further, EPA grants to the states to implement and enforce en-
vironmental programs generally fell by 9% between 1997 and 2006, 
and by 22% between fiscal years 2004 and 2006.13
 The compliance figures provided by the PIRG report for 2005 do 
not appear to be anomalous. According to EPA, for example, more 
than half of all major facilities violated their CWA permits during fiscal 
year 1998 and more than twenty percent of these dischargers were in 
significant noncompliance.14 A 2001 report issued by EPA’s Office of 
Inspector General revealed compliance rates for major dischargers of 
less than seventy-five percent in twenty states in fiscal year 2000 and 
more than one-third of the states reported that more than half of the 
                                                                                                                      
7 Christy Leavitt, U.S. PIRG Educ. Fund, Troubled Waters: An Analysis of 2005 
Clean Water Act Compliance 1 (2007), available at http://www.uspirg.org/html/troubled 
waters07/troubled_waters07.pdf. The 3600 facilities reported more than 24,400 exceedances 
of their CWA permit limits during 2005. Id.; see infra note 57 and accompanying text (defin-
ing major facilities). 
8 Leavitt, supra note 7, at 2. Eighty-one facilities reported violations for every monthly 
reporting period in 2005. Id. 




13 Id. (citing U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-07-883, EPA-State Enforce-
ment Partnership Has Improved, but EPA’s Oversight Needs Further Enhancement 
15 (2007)). 
14 For purposes of the CWA, EPA defines significant noncompliance (SNC) with respect 
to conventional pollutants, such as total suspended solids, as “exceeding an average monthly 
limit by 40% in any two months of a six-month period.” Clifford Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the 
Clean Water Act in the Twenty-First Century: Harnessing the Power of the Public Spotlight, 55 Ala. L. 
Rev. 775, 781–82 (2004) (citing U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Water Pollution: Many 
Violations Have not Received Appropriate Enforcement Attention 3 (1996)). 
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major facilities with significant violations in fiscal year 1999 had recur-
ring violations in 2000.15
 As one attorney involved in environmental enforcement matters 
has stated, “Although an appropriate metric for measuring the effec-
tiveness of enforcement is elusive, low compliance rates are indicative 
of ineffective enforcement.”16 Moreover, “[R]egulatory law and com-
pliance are so systematically intertwined that neither can be under-
stood without understanding both. This is surely the case with envi-
ronmental protection law.”17 If Congress, EPA, the states, and the 
American public are indeed as concerned about recommitting to the 
achievement of the CWA’s goals as the October 2007 Senate resolu-
tion indicates, they should be analyzing ways to make the govern-
ment’s environmental enforcement activities more effective than they 
seem to have been in recent years. 
 This Article is designed to provide information that may enable 
the federal and state agencies involved in enforcement of environ-
mental requirements—particularly requirements derived from the 
CWA—to make their enforcement activities more effective at improving 
environmental performance by regulated entities. Environmental 
agencies at both the federal and state levels have a variety of options 
when faced with alleged noncompliance with environmental statutes, 
regulations, and permits. These options, which we refer to as govern-
ment interventions, or simply interventions, include inspections of 
regulated facilities, actions to impose administrative or judicial civil 
penalties for past violations, efforts to enjoin ongoing violations, and 
the approval of supplemental environmental projects. Scholars have 
begun to explore whether some of these enforcement options are more 
effective at inducing better environmental performance by regulated 
entities than others.18 They have also assessed whether a traditional de-
terrence-based approach to enforcement or an approach based on co-
                                                                                                                      
15 Richard Webster, Federal Environmental Enforcement: Is Less More?, 18 Fordham Envtl. 
L. Rev. 303, 314 (2007) (citing Office of Inspector Gen., EPA, Rep. No. 2001-P-00013, 
Water Enforcement: State Enforcement of Clean Water Act Dischargers Can Be 
More Effective 55, 57 (2001)). 
16 Id. 
17 Peter Cleary Yeager, Industrial Water Pollution, 18 Crime & Just. 97, 99 (1993) [here-
inafter Yeager, Water Pollution]. 
18 See generally Robert L. Glicksman & Dietrich H. Earnhart, The Comparative Effectiveness 
of Government Interventions on Environmental Performance in the Chemical Industry, 26 Stan. 
Envtl. L.J. 317 (2007) (providing examples of methods of government intervention and 
discussing their effectiveness). 
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operation and the provision of compliance assistance is more likely to 
result in greater improvements in environmental performance.19
 One question that has by and large been neglected to date is 
whether the features of a regulated facility are likely to affect the effi-
cacy of government interventions, such as inspections, civil penalty 
proceedings, or actions for injunctive relief, in improving environ-
mental performance. This Article addresses that question by examin-
ing a study of compliance with CWA permits by major facilities in the 
chemical industry. It assesses whether the following factors should 
make a difference in the effectiveness of interventions as a theoretical 
matter: (1) facility features relating to the regulatory program, such as 
the effluent limit level; (2) facility characteristics related to the pro-
duction process of the facility being regulated, such as facility size, as 
measured by flow capacity; and (3) firm ownership structure. The Ar-
ticle also evaluates whether those factors appear to have made a dif-
ference at the facilities covered by the study. The findings should be 
of interest not only to facilities regulated under the CWA, but also to 
federal and state regulators seeking to maximize the impact of their 
enforcement actions, improve compliance rates, and minimize the 
adverse effects of regulatory violations on the environment. 
 Part I of the Article describes the insights provided by previous 
theoretical and empirical studies on the influence of either facility or 
firm features on the effectiveness of the government interventions we 
explore. For each of the facility and firm features we analyze, we rely on 
these previous studies to explain the anticipated effects of each feature 
on environmental performance following an intervention. Part II de-
scribes our sample selection and data collection techniques. In Part III, 
we explain our statistical analysis and interpret the results of our study of 
environmental performance by facilities in the chemical industry. As 
part of this interpretation, we determine whether these results conform 
to, or deviate from, the expectations we generate in Part I of the Article. 
 Our empirical results provide only weak or mixed support for the 
identified expectations. For example, larger facilities are expected to be 
more responsive to actual or threatened government interventions, yet 
only one of the eight empirical results supports this expectation. As an-
                                                                                                                      
19 See Clifford Rechtschaffen & David L. Markell, Reinventing Environmental 
Enforcement and the State/Federal Relationship 60–61 (2003). See generally Robert 
L. Glicksman & Dietrich H. Earnhart, Depiction of the Regulator-Regulated Entity Relationship 
in the Chemical Industry: Deterrence-Based vs. Cooperative Enforcement, 31 Wm. & Mary Envtl. 
L. & Pol’y Rev. 603 (2007) (comparing deterrence-based governmental intervention with 
a cooperative approach). 
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other example, higher effluent limit levels—in other words, less strin-
gent limits—are expected to improve the effectiveness of government 
interventions. Yet, only one of the eight empirical results is consistent 
with this expectation, while five of the eight results are inconsistent with 
it. As the final example, greater discharge volatility is expected to im-
prove the effectiveness of government interventions. Only two of the 
eight empirical results, however, support this expectation, while four of 
the eight results run directly counter to it. We suggest that further em-
pirical studies be conducted to determine whether facility and firm fea-
tures, including but not limited to the ones analyzed in this Article, in-
fluence the effectiveness of government interventions on environmental 
performance. 
I. Insights from Previous Studies: Expectations About the 
Influence of Facility/Firm Features on the Effectiveness  
of Government Interventions 
 We assess the influence of three categories of facility features on 
the effectiveness of government interventions at inducing better envi-
ronmental performance. The first category includes three features that 
relate to the nature of the regulatory program: limit level, limit type, 
and permit modification. We also assess the influence of three features 
that are inherent to a regulated facility’s production process: flow ca-
pacity, which serves as a proxy for facility size; the flow-to-flow capacity 
ratio, which serves as a proxy for capacity utilization; and discharge 
volatility. Finally, we assess the influence of one facility feature that is 
more accurately described as a firm characteristic: ownership structure. 
 In this Part, we summarize previous studies that bear on the rele-
vance of these seven facility features for capturing the full effect of gov-
ernment interventions on environmental performance, measured in 
our study by the amounts actually discharged divided by the amount of 
discharge authorized by an applicable permit. For each of the seven 
features, we develop a set of expectations—or, in some cases, a set of 
alternative expectations—as to how the effectiveness of government 
interventions should be affected by the presence or greater magnitude 
of these features. In Part III, we compare these expectations to the per-
formance of facilities in the chemical industry during the period of our 
study to determine whether they conform to, or deviate from, the ex-
pectations. 
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A. Facility Features Related to the Regulatory Program 
1. Limit Level 
 The first facility feature we assess is the stringency of the effluent 
limit to which a particular facility is subject. The question addressed is 
whether a facility subject to an effluent limit under the CWA is likely to 
be more or less responsive to an intervention than a similarly situated 
facility with a less stringent limit. We found no previous studies that as-
sessed the relationship between limit level and responsiveness to gov-
ernment interventions. Previous studies have addressed a related ques-
tion: the relationship between limit level and environmental perfor-
mance. One study summarized literature postulating that under higher 
levels of regulation, facilities were less likely to perceive economic in-
centives to engage in the development of environmentally innovative 
technology.20 Another study focusing on the behavior of regulatory 
agencies, rather than the performance of regulated entities, inquired 
whether systematic biases operated in regulatory law enforcement. The 
study found that permit stringency under the CWA affected the fre-
quency of violations. In particular, “[W]here the legal requirements 
[were] most substantial, violations [were] more common.”21 Neither of 
these studies, however, sought to assess whether regulatory stringency 
affected the degree to which a regulated entity responded to govern-
ment interventions. 
 Although neither of these two studies addresses the precise ques-
tion at issue in our study, their findings are consistent with the supposi-
tion that it is more difficult for facilities subject to stringent limits to 
improve their performance than it is for facilities subject to less strin-
gent limits. The costs of reducing discharges to the levels needed to 
comply with stringent limits may be higher, for example, than the costs 
of making reductions needed to comply with more lenient limits. Simi-
larly, a facility operating with pollution-control technology that is capa-
ble of achieving compliance with stringent effluent limits may find it 
more difficult to improve its performance in response to an interven-
                                                                                                                      
20 Mark Sharfman, Regulation and Sustainable Development: The Management of Envi-
ronmentally Conscious Technological Innovation Under Alternative Market Conditions 
( June 4, 2001), in Beyond Compliance: What Motivates Environmental Behavior? 1–2 
(Sylvan Envtl. Consultants ed., 2001), available at http://es.epa.gov/ncer/publications/ 
workshop/bynd_com_sess2.pdf (editor’s summary of presentation). 
21 Peter C. Yeager, Structural Bias in Regulatory Law Enforcement: The Case of the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, 34 Soc. Probs. 330 (1987) [hereinafter Yeager, Regulatory Law 
Enforcement]. 
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tion following noncompliance than a facility operating with similar 
technology but subject to a higher and more easily achieved limit. 
These considerations induce us to test the proposition that the tougher 
a facility’s limit is, the harder the regulated source is already being 
pushed, and thus, the harder it will be for the facility to reduce dis-
charge levels in response to an intervention. 
2. Effluent Limit Type 
 The second feature related to the regulatory program we seek to 
assess is the type of limit to which a regulated facility is subject. Some 
limits are initial or interim. These interim limits represent weigh sta-
tions on the road to the imposition of a final effluent limit. Under 
other federal regulatory programs, interim limits are typically less strin-
gent than final limits. Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act, for example, some facilities for the treatment, storage, and disposal 
of hazardous waste that qualified for interim status were allowed to 
comply for a limited time with a set of waste management standards 
that were less stringent than the standards that went into effect after 
the expiration of interim status.22 Under the CWA, facilities are some-
times required to comply with interim limits while they are undergoing 
treatment technology upgrades.23 In our study, however, we controlled 
for the level of the limit. Our interest is in determining whether the 
label placed on the limit, interim versus final, is itself a significant factor 
in the nature of a facility’s performance following an intervention. 
 One previous study found that publicly owned treatment plants 
subject to final limits under the CWA outperformed those subject only 
to an interim limit.24 That study concluded that regulators could im-
prove performance by avoiding the issuance of interim limits.25 That 
aspect of the study, however, did not involve an effort to assess the im-
pact of interventions on facilities with different features. We did not 
locate other studies with findings relevant to the question of whether 
                                                                                                                      
22 See Adam Babich, Too Much Science in Environmental Law, 28 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 119, 
163 (2003) (“‘[I]nterim status’ facilities operate pursuant to generic regulations, which are 
lax in contrast to the detailed and stringent permits that apply to non-grandfathered op-
erations.”). 
23 See, e.g., Notice of Lodging of Consent Decree Under the Clean Water Act, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 68,979, 68,979 (Nov. 26, 2004); see also 40 C.F.R. § 131.41(f)(7) (2007). 
24 Dietrich Earnhart, Regulatory Factors Shaping Environmental Performance at Publicly-
Owned Treatment Plants, 48 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 655, 676 (2004). 
25 Id. 
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interventions affect performance differently at facilities subject to in-
terim and final limits. 
 Because an interim limit does not represent the long-term, final 
regulatory obligation with which a regulated facility must comply, regu-
lated sources may not take interim limits as seriously as final limits. If 
facilities do not, they are not likely to react as seriously to interventions 
directed at interim limits as they would to interventions directed at fi-
nal limits. If interim limits are not taken as seriously, performance im-
provements should be relatively greater after interventions directed at 
noncompliance with final limits than after interventions directed at 
noncompliance with interim limits. Our study seeks to determine 
whether the performance of facilities in the chemical industry in re-
sponse to deterrence from government interventions is consistent with 
this explanation of likely facility performance. 
3. Permit Modification 
 The third facility feature that relates to the regulatory program is 
the presence or absence of a permit modification. Regulators may be 
willing to modify a facility’s permit following a determination that the 
facility has not complied with the obligations reflected in the permit 
in lieu of imposing sanctions at that time. We are interested in deter-
mining whether the fact that a facility’s permit has been modified is 
likely to affect the responsiveness to interventions.26 We regard the 
presence or absence of a permit modification to be a proxy for the 
degree of cooperation between regulators and regulated facilities.27
 Once again, we found few previous studies that are relevant to this 
question. Previous research supports the notion that a facility’s reputa-
tion with its environmental regulator may affect the regulator’s willing-
ness to be flexible in crafting and enforcing permits.28 Facilities that 
have built up reputational capital with the regulator may be treated more 
                                                                                                                      
26 Once again, we controlled for the limit level in testing for the influence of permit 
modifications on the effectiveness of interventions at inducing better performance so that 
our results are independent of limit level; only the context in which the interventions take 
place or are threatened is different, that is, either a facility’s permit has been modified or 
it has not. 
27 The proxy is less than perfect because we cannot tell from the data the nature of a 
particular permit modification, for example, whether it reflects a significant or insignifi-
cant modification and whether it was unilaterally imposed by the regulator or the product 
of negotiations between the regulator and the regulated facility. 
28 Robert A. Kagan et al., Explaining Corporate Environmental Performance: How Does Regu-
lation Matter?, 37 Law & Soc’y Rev. 51, 74–75 (2003). 
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leniently or flexibly than those that have not.29 Another study found 
that plants regulated under the federal Clean Air Act (CAA) that had 
fewer instances of noncompliance received permits from regulators 
more quickly than did plants with more instances of noncompliance.30
 One nonempirical, theoretical study is more directly on point, and 
it supports the analysis in the preceding paragraph. One of the norms 
described in Professor Michael Vandenburgh’s study of social norms in 
environmental compliance is the norm of reciprocity.31 Vandenburgh 
defines this norm as expressing the idea that “[a]n individual should 
give benefits to those who have given her benefits.”32 He provides one 
example of the manner in which this norm may operate in the context 
of environmental compliance, suggesting that the provision of compli-
ance assistance by a regulator “may trigger a sense of obligation to re-
ciprocate by the managers of the regulated entity.”33 The reciprocity 
                                                                                                                      
29 Id. 
30 Christopher S. Decker, Corporate Environmentalism and Environmental Statutory Permit-
ting, 46 J.L. & Econ. 103, 106, 126 (2003). Both of these studies deal with the manner in 
which compliance or noncompliance affects the behavior of regulators. Our concern, 
however, is the manner in which facility features affect the responsiveness of regulated 
facilities to interventions. Nevertheless, the anticipated behavior of regulators may impact 
the manner in which regulated facilities respond to interventions. If a facility believes that 
it is likely to be treated more harshly by regulators if it has already squandered its reputa-
tional capital as a result of past noncompliance, it may be more committed to improving 
its performance following an intervention directed at a modified permit than if the inter-
vention had not followed a modification triggered by a previous violation. 
EPA guidance documents on enforcement of the CWA may reinforce the motivation 
of regulated entities to avoid antagonizing regulators. EPA determines the size of the civil 
penalties it assesses against regulated facilities found to be in noncompliance with their 
regulatory obligations by calculating the amount necessary to recover from the violator all 
of the economic benefits of noncompliance. See, e.g., Calculation of the Economic Benefit 
of Noncompliance in EPA’s Civil Penalty Enforcement Cases, 70 Fed. Reg. 50,326, 50,326 
(Aug. 26, 2005). It then adds to that amount a gravity factor that can either mitigate or 
enhance the amount of the penalty. See EPA, Interim Clean Water Act Settlement 
Penalty Policy 12–13 (1995), available at http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/ 
policies/civil/cwa/cwapol.pdf [hereinafter Interim CWA Settlement Penalty Policy]. 
EPA has indicated that it will increase the gravity factor based on lack of cooperation; bad 
faith; unjustified delay in preventing, remedying, or mitigating the violation; or past non-
compliance. Id. at 12. Conversely, EPA will reduce the gravity factor based on cooperation 
by regulated facilities, such as negotiations leading to quick settlement. Id. at 13. Regulated 
facilities may be highly motivated to avoid noncompliance with a modified permit if the 
modification resulted from an instance of past noncompliance because they may fear that 
another violation will trigger an enhanced gravity factor in the calculation of administra-
tive civil penalties. See id. at 12–13. 
31 Michael P. Vandenburgh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corpo-
rate Environmental Compliance, 22 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 55, 108–12 (2003). 
32 Id. at 108. 
33 Id. at 109. 
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norm thus suggests that if a regulator has already afforded slack to a 
regulated facility by modifying its permit, the facility’s managers may 
believe that it is important for the facility to provide a quid pro quo in 
the form of future improvements in environmental performance to 
maintain a good working relationship with the regulator. Put in slightly 
different terms, a facility with a permit that has been modified may feel 
that it has used up its storehouse of goodwill with regulators and that 
regulators will not respond favorably to future noncompliance. As a 
result, a facility with a modified permit may be more committed to im-
proving performance in response to interventions, or their threat, than 
a facility with an unmodified permit. 
 It is possible, however, that a permit modification may send quite a 
different signal to the managers of regulated facilities. If the response 
of the regulator to a facility’s past noncompliance has been to modify 
its permit to make it more lenient, the facility’s managers may conclude 
that all regulatory obligations are open to negotiation and that none 
should be taken too seriously. As a result, interventions do not warrant 
much concern because, should the modified permit be violated, the 
facility is likely to be able to persuade the regulator to modify the per-
mit again, with a still more lenient effluent limit. Therefore, facilities 
with permits that have been modified may be no more likely, and may 
even be less likely, to improve performance in response to interven-
tions, or their threat, than facilities with permits that have not been 
modified. This line of reasoning runs directly opposite to the analysis 
suggested by the reciprocity norm. One question we address in Part III 
is whether the results of our study are more consistent with one or the 
other of the expectations outlined in this subsection. 
B. Facility Features Inherent to the Production Process 
1. Facility Size 
 The first of the three features that are inherent to a facility’s pro-
duction process in which we are interested is the size of the facility. One 
way to measure the size of the facility is to count the number of em-
ployees. Because we lack information about the number of employees 
at the facilities for which we have performance data, we are unable to 
use the number of employees as a proxy for facility size. Instead, we 
chose to use a facility’s flow capacity—the amount of wastewater it is 
capable of discharging over the course of an entire day—as a proxy for 
its size. 
12 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 35:1 
 Some researchers have produced empirical studies of the impact 
of firm size on environmental compliance, and some of it has even 
related to the effect of government interventions. One study of com-
pliance with air pollution controls by U.S. pulp and paper mills found 
that plants owned by large firms, whether measured by number of 
firm employees or number of other mills owned by the firm, are less 
sensitive to inspections but more sensitive to other enforcement ac-
tions than those owned by smaller firms.34 That conclusion related to 
firm size rather than facility size. 
 The theoretical literature suggests a reason to expect that larger 
facilities are more responsive to government interventions or their 
threat than are smaller facilities. One study postulated that larger fa-
cilities are likely to enjoy “regulatory economies of scale” that are not 
available to smaller facilities to the extent that they can amortize 
compliance costs over larger volumes of production.35 Similarly, re-
searchers have asserted that larger firms, as opposed to facilities, tend 
to be better environmental performers than smaller firms because the 
former have more resources to spare for environmental engineering 
and management.36
                                                                                                                      
 
34 Wayne B. Gray & Ronald J. Shadbegian, When and Why Do Plants Comply? Paper Mills 
in the 1980s, 27 Law & Pol’y 238, 255–56 (2005). 
35 Yeager, Regulatory Law Enforcment, supra note 21, at 340. Larger facilities also may be 
able to pass on regulatory compliance costs to their customers more easily than smaller 
facilities operating in more competitive environments. Id.; see Yeager, Water Pollution, supra 
note 17, at 130. Another study suggests that “administrative economies of scale” may also 
affect regulatory compliance efforts in that smaller organizations may have fewer resources 
to discover and interpret the regulations and that these disadvantages can affect ability to 
comply. Thomas J. Dean & Robert L. Brown, Pollution Regulation as a Barrier to New Firm 
Entry: Initial Evidence and Implications for Future Research, 38 Acad. Mgmt. J. 288, 291 (1995). 
But cf. Earnhart, supra note 24, at 675 (reporting that publicly owned treatment plants 
experience diseconomies of scale in treatment of biological oxygen-demanding material); 
Louis W. Nadeau, EPA Effectiveness at Reducing the Duration of Plant-Level Noncompliance, 34 J. 
Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 54, 75 (1997) (postulating that there may be no economies of 
scale in CAA compliance by the pulp and paper industry). “Firms that can spread these 
administrative compliance costs over a larger volume of production will likely gain a per 
unit cost advantage.” Dean & Brown, supra, at 291. 
36 See Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New System of Environmental Regulation: The Case for an 
Industry Sector Approach, 26 Envtl. L. 457, 481 (1996) (asserting that “[l]arger firms have 
greater access to capital, better economies of scale, [and] greater sources of technical ad-
vice and support,” providing them with greater capacity to avoid noncompliance with envi-
ronmental requirements); Kagan et al., supra note 28, at 80. The authors found empirical 
support for the proposition that pulp and paper mills owned by larger corporations, and 
those with larger current profits and rising stock prices, had better environmental per-
formance than those owned by corporations with lower sales, smaller earnings, and declin-
ing share prices. Id.; cf. Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Why Do Firms Pollute (and 
Reduce) Toxic Emissions 31 (2000), available at http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/files/ 
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 Accordingly, our results permit us to assess whether interventions 
in the chemical industry tend to induce greater improvements in envi-
ronmental performance at larger facilities than at smaller ones. If so, 
that result would be consistent with the expectation that larger facilities 
find it easier to make cost-effective reductions than smaller facilities 
because they have greater economies of scale. A larger facility may have 
unexhausted economies of scale that it chooses not to take advantage 
of because of the low risk of getting caught. If the risk rises or the facil-
ity is actually caught, the facility may decide to improve its performance 
to take advantage of those economies of scale. Those unexhausted 
economies of scale are less likely to be available at a smaller facility, 
making improvements in performance in response to actual interven-
tions, or their threat, more costly and more difficult to achieve.37
 Additional considerations support the expectation that larger fa-
cilities respond better to interventions than do smaller ones. A facility’s 
owners may choose to avoid making the expenditures necessary to 
produce compliance in order to bolster the facility’s profitability and 
hope that the facility does not become the subject of an enforcement 
action. If the employees who implement the decisions that result in ei-
ther compliance or noncompliance do not share the owners’ concern 
for maximizing profitability, they may choose to take the steps neces-
sary to comply, notwithstanding the owners’ wishes. They may do so for 
altruistic reasons, a commitment to the goals of environmental protec-
tion laws, or a general preference for compliance with the law. Profes-
sor David Spence has suggested that “in smaller firms the organiza-
tional distance between owners and employees who make actual 
compliance decisions is shorter, offering fewer opportunities for these 
kinds of agency losses. According to this logic, we would expect to see 
more noncompliance among smaller firms than larger ones.”38 This 
logic ought to extend to decisions concerning whether to improve en-
vironmental performance following an intervention. Professor 
Spence’s analysis, however, applies at the firm, not the facility level, and 
there is likely to be less of a difference in organizational distance at the 
                                                                                                                      
fnddVm/why%20do%20firms%20pollute.pdf (“Firms in more concentrated industries 
and with higher cash flows tend to be lower baseline emitters of toxic chemicals.”). 
37 As we use the term in this Article, a firm refers to the corporation or other business 
entity that owns a facility. A facility is a particular discharging plant. A firm may own more 
than one facility. 
38 David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of the Rational 
Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 917, 971 (2001) (footnotes omitted). 
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facility than at the firm level.39 If so, this explanation for why we might 
expect larger facilities to respond more effectively to interventions than 
smaller facilities appears to be less significant than the economies of 
scale rationale. 
 Yet another factor provides an alternative explanation for greater 
responsiveness to government interventions at larger facilities. Larger 
facilities may be more sensitive to negative publicity surrounding 
noncompliance with environmental responsibilities. Local public in-
terest groups may pay more attention to the compliance status of lar-
ger facilities and, therefore, exert more pressure on larger facilities to 
remedy noncompliance than they do at the smaller facilities, where 
noncompliance may not have as great an impact on the surrounding 
environment. In addition, larger facilities will have more employees 
than smaller ones and may depend on a positive image within the 
community to attract and retain a qualified workforce. For these rea-
sons, larger facilities may have a larger reputational stake in compli-
ance status than smaller facilities do and may, therefore, have stronger 
incentives to avoid repeat noncompliance events. Various researchers 
have noted this greater reputational stake as a possible reason that 
larger firms and facilities may be better environmental performers 
than smaller firms and facilities generally, although they have not ad-
dressed the question in the specific context of the impact of govern-
ment interventions on environmental performance.40
 Another set of considerations, however, may generate the oppo-
site expectation—that smaller facilities are more likely to respond to 
interventions than are larger facilities. If plant managers and other 
decisionmakers concerning environmental compliance at larger fa-
cilities believe that those facilities are less likely to become the sub-
jects of government interventions than smaller facilities with less po-
litical clout, they may have less incentive to avoid noncompliance. In 
this vein, one study found that larger companies had a degree of insu-
lation from interventions that was not available to smaller companies 
because they had greater resources to take advantage of available legal 
remedies, such as appeals to challenge or slow down government ef-
                                                                                                                      
39 Id. at 919 (discussing “the idea of the firm as a rational polluter”). 
40 See, e.g., Konar & Cohen, supra note 36, at 11–12 (claiming that large firms have 
more at stake concerning negative publicity about environmental compliance due to their 
size and visibility); Kagan et al., supra note 28, at 66 (noting the “greater visibility and repu-
tational concerns” of larger firms). 
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forts to impose liability on them.41 The study suggested that if larger 
facilities feared interventions less than smaller ones because larger 
facilities believed regulators were loathe to intervene against regu-
lated entities with the resources to fight the charges vigorously, these 
larger facilities saw less need than smaller facilities to avoid noncom-
pliance. This argument would seem to be weaker, however, if a larger 
facility has already been the subject of an intervention, because the 
intervention indicates that regulators are at least sometimes willing to 
tackle large and well-funded facilities.42
 We can test the validity of the theory that larger facilities have less 
to fear from interventions than smaller ones and, therefore, will tend to 
be less responsive to the threat of interventions than smaller facilities, 
by comparing the general deterrent effect of an inspection with the 
general deterrent effect of the imposition of a judicial or administrative 
sanction. All facilities are inspected. Further, the size and resource posi-
tion of larger facilities is likely to be less effective in blocking inspec-
tions than in impeding government interventions that require adminis-
trative or judicial proceedings before a sanction may be imposed. 
Accordingly, if the belief by larger facilities that they are not likely to be 
targeted by government interventions does in fact lessen the incentives 
of such firms to improve performance relative to smaller facilities, we 
would expect to see a greater degree of responsiveness by larger facili-
ties to the threat of an inspection than to the threat of a sanction. 
 In summary, the size of the regulated facility may make a differ-
ence in how it responds to interventions, or their threat, for several rea-
sons. The environmental compliance literature most strongly supports 
the view that larger facilities will respond more strongly to interventions 
than will smaller ones because larger facilities have economies of scale 
                                                                                                                      
41 See Yeager, Regulatory Law Enforcement, supra note 21, at 338, 340; cf. Yeager, Water Pol-
lution, supra note 17, at 130–31, 136 (finding that larger firms are more likely to participate 
in adjudicatory hearing procedures available in CWA enforcement proceedings and that 
use of those procedures was associated with lower violation rates). One source describes 
the “belief of many close observers,” not adequately subject to empirical examination, 
“that serious enforcement efforts . . . are rarely directed at large corporations deserving of 
them and instead are focused on smaller firms less likely to put up formidable resistance.” 
Id. 
42 In our empirical analysis, we measure the number of inspections completed at spe-
cific facilities and the dollar value of sanctions imposed against those facilities as our 
measure of specific deterrence. If larger facilities are less likely to receive interventions, 
then the size of a facility and the degree of intervention are strongly correlated. In this 
case, the empirical analysis will not be able to discern effectively the separate effects of 
facility size and specific deterrence and the influence of facility size on the effectiveness of 
specific deterrence. 
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not available to smaller facilities. The greater distance between owner-
ship and environmental management at larger facilities or firms, and 
the likelihood that larger facilities will experience adverse publicity and 
public pressure, may provide additional, though perhaps less impor-
tant, reasons to expect greater responsiveness from larger facilities as 
compared to smaller ones. Finally, the relatively greater ability of larger 
facilities to exercise the political clout needed to block interventions or 
to force the government to spend more resources pursuing interven-
tions has the potential to weaken the incentives of larger facilities to 
avoid noncompliance in response to the threat of interventions. 
2. Capacity Utilization 
 The second characteristic we choose to study that is related to fea-
tures inherent in a facility’s production process is the flow-to-flow ca-
pacity ratio. This feature serves as a proxy for capacity utilization by 
providing information that indicates whether a facility is operating at or 
below full capacity. We found no studies that address the relevance of 
capacity utilization to environmental performance, either generally or 
in the specific context of government interventions. Our study is, 
therefore, the first one of which we are aware that empirically evaluates 
the relevance of this characteristic to environmental performance. 
 Our expectation is that facilities with a relatively low flow ratio— 
those not operating at or near full capacity—ought to be more respon-
sive to government interventions than those with a relatively high flow 
ratio. As capacity utilization increases, a facility’s ability to adjust opera-
tions in ways that improve environmental performance ought to de-
cline because a plant operating at or near full capacity generally has 
less operational flexibility than one operating at a lower degree of ca-
pacity utilization. Our results permit us to test that expectation.43
                                                                                                                      
43 EPA’s enforcement policies seem to favor facilities operating with low rather than 
high flow ratios because EPA’s civil penalty calculation methodology includes a reduction 
in the gravity factor corresponding to flow reduction. Under that methodology, the greater 
the reduction in average daily wastewater discharge flow, in gallons per day, the greater the 
percentage reduction of the gravity factor. See Interim CWA Settlement Penalty Pol-
icy, supra note 30, at 12. Perhaps EPA seeks through that approach to discourage facilities 
from seeking to present a misleading picture of their discharges by diluting wastewater to 
decrease concentrations of regulated pollutants. 
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3. Discharge Volatility 
 The third and final feature relating to the production process that 
we measure in our study is discharge volatility. This characteristic meas-
ures the degree of variation in discharge levels at a facility from month 
to month over the course of a calendar year. We found a series of stud-
ies by a pair of researchers that analyze the impact of discharge volatil-
ity, or variability, in the context of CWA compliance.44 The studies do 
not involve, however, the effects of government interventions on com-
pliance. The authors of the studies describe the relevance of volatility to 
compliance status as follows: 
Plants are posited to pollute below their permitted level, on 
average, to provide a safety margin in the case of an unexpect-
edly large discharge. We call this the safety margin explanation 
of overcompliance. Plants reduce their average discharge so 
that they are more likely to fall below a discharge rate of 1.0 
during a very bad month.45
The authors further stated: 
The claim that discharges are low on average to compensate 
for discharge variability implies that discharges will be lower, 
relative to the permit level, for plants with more variable dis-
charges. A plant with highly variable discharges should aim for 
lower average discharges than a plant with low discharge vari-
ability. This is a straightforward hypothesis, but its import has 
not been recognized to our knowledge.46
                                                                                                                      
44 Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay & John Horowitz, Do Plants Overcomply with Water Pollution 
Regulations? The Role of Discharge Variability, B.E. J. Econ. Analysis & Pol’y, Jan. 2006, at 1, 
1, available at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1486&context=bejeap. 
The authors state that “[n]o other studies have explicitly modeled discharge variability to 
our knowledge.” Id. at 4. 
45 Id. at 3. The authors found that “[d]ischarges exhibit considerable variability on a 
month-to-month basis,” and that “[v]ariability arises due to natural variability in the com-
position of complex organic wastes, environmental factors, and operational factors.” Id. at 
6 (citations omitted); see also Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay & John K. Horowitz, Overcompliance 
with the Clean Water Act?, in Beyond Compliance: What Motivates Environmental Be-
havior?, supra note 20, at 10 (“Because plants cannot control discharges exactly, they aim 
to pollute below their permitted levels, so that when they have a stretch of exceptionally 
high discharges they will still likely be in compliance with their permits. This factor leads 
discharges to be below the permitted level on average.”). The authors in their 2001 paper 
found an inverse relationship between discharge variability and median discharges. Id. at 
14. 
46 Bandyopadhyay & Horowitz, supra note 44, at 11–12 (footnote omitted). 
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The authors ultimately found “strong evidence that uncontrollable 
discharge variability leads water-polluting plants to reduce their aver-
age discharges. Plants pollute below—sometimes far below—their 
permitted levels to reduce the chance of a violation.”47
 The previous studies on discharge volatility do not assess the im-
pact of government interventions on facilities with high and low levels 
of discharge volatility. Their explanation for how facilities are likely to 
respond to volatility, however, is useful in formulating expectations for 
the impact of discharge volatility on the effectiveness of interventions. 
As described above, facilities will attempt to maintain safety margins to 
minimize instances of noncompliance. To maintain the same margin of 
safety as the volatility of discharges increases, a facility must push down 
its chosen level of discharges relative to the amounts allowed by its 
permit to create the same probability of being at or below the permit 
level. A facility with greater discharge volatility is, therefore, more likely 
to reduce discharges in response to interventions, or their threat, than 
one with less volatility. In other words, when a facility is facing greater 
volatility, a greater reduction in the mean discharge level is needed to 
demonstrate the same degree of commitment to compliance in some 
probabilistic sense—when, for example, the probability of an effluent 
limit exceedance drops from five percent to one percent. Our results 
enable us to test whether discharge volatility is linked to reduced re-
sponsiveness to government interventions. 
C. Ownership Structure 
 The sole characteristic relating to the firms rather than the facili-
ties that we address in this study is ownership structure. We distinguish 
exclusively between publicly held and privately held firms. We choose 
not to explore this characteristic in depth. The literature, both theo-
retical and empirical, relating to the impact of ownership structure on 
environmental performance is far more extensive than it is for most of 
the facility features described above. This literature makes it possible to 
offer a variety of competing hypotheses, angles, and perspectives con-
cerning the relevance of ownership structure. We choose to describe a 
limited range of these hypotheses without providing much insight into 
their significance or strength. For the purposes of our empirical analy-
                                                                                                                      
47 Id. at 25–26. The authors suggest that, because of differences in the variability of 
measures over different time periods, enforcement of standards over a shorter time, such 
as daily limits, “would likely reduce discharges further; while a move to enforce standards 
over a longer time (say, annual quantity) would likely raise discharges.” Id. at 26. 
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sis, we include ownership structure and its interactions with the various 
government intervention measures as regressors in our multivariate 
regression analysis in order to avoid omitted variable bias so that we can 
properly and accurately assess the other interactions.48 Even though 
the interactions between ownership structure and interventions are not 
our primary interest, we nevertheless include these interactions as re-
gressors in order to isolate properly the interactions between interven-
tions and the facility-related features addressed in our study. 
 Our assessment of expectations is brief. On the one hand, inves-
tor pressure might be expected to induce greater responsiveness to 
actual or threatened interventions from a privately held firm than 
from a publicly held firm.49 The relative susceptibility of privately held 
and publicly held firms to agency costs may tend to support the same 
expectation. On the other hand, the desire to avoid a fall in stock 
prices seems to provide reason to expect greater responsiveness to 
actual or threatened government interventions from publicly held 
facilities.50 These considerations, however, are hedged with qualifica-
tions that weaken the theoretical reason to believe that privately held 
and publicly held firms respond differently to a significant extent. 
II. Empirical Analysis: Sample Selection and Data 
 In this Part, we describe our empirical analysis. The first subsec-
tion describes our reasons for choosing to analyze the relationship 
                                                                                                                      
48 Omitted variable bias occurs when a regression fails to include, or omits, a variable, 
other than the one being tested, upon which the decisionmaker actually based a decision. 
Under those circumstances, the regression can erroneously indicate that the decision-
maker relied on the variable being tested. See, e.g., Stuart T. Rossman, Analyzing Disparate 
Impact Credit Discrimination in the Subprime Lending Market, 1533 PLI/Corp 601, 609 (2006). 
49 See Konar & Cohen, supra note 36, at 16 (arguing that “firms whose managers and 
directors have a higher percentage ownership of the firm are more likely to be responsive 
to shareholder needs”; those firms tend to be privately held firms). 
50 See Rechtschaffen, supra note 14, at 806–07 (citing studies finding that stock prices 
rise and fall in response to the release of positive or negative information about firms’ 
environmental performance and asserting that “the stock market also can create strong 
incentives for firms to improve environmental compliance as investors increasingly look to 
environmental performance as a relevant investment criterion”); Spence, supra note 38, at 
969; cf. Jérôme Foulon et al., Incentives for Pollution Control: Regulation or Information?, 44 J. 
Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 169, 175 (2002) (citing evidence that investors are increasingly 
scrutinizing environmental performance in investment decisions); Madhu Khanna & Wil-
liam Rose Q. Anton, Corporate Environmental Management: Regulatory and Market-Based Incen-
tives, 78 Land Econ. 539, 541 (2002) (stating that reputation among shareholders is con-
tributing to the growth of “corporate environmentalism” and that “bankers are beginning 
to include environmental considerations in their lending decisions and viewing poor envi-
ronmental performers as financially risky”). 
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between government interventions and facility features in the context 
of the performance of chemical manufacturing facilities regulated 
under the CWA. The second subsection explains the manner in which 
we selected our sample of regulated facilities and the reasons why we 
anticipate that the sample will be representative of environmental 
performance in the chemical industry. Subsequent subsections de-
scribe the multiple sources of our data and how we integrate these 
sources, while explaining our sample selection criteria. 
A. Scope of Empirical Analysis 
 Our study assesses the efficacy of various government interven-
tions on facilities in the industrial sector of chemical and allied prod-
ucts that are regulated under the CWA’s National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit program.51 The study is based on 
statistical analysis of performance displayed by individual chemical 
manufacturing facilities. Our analysis relates to a specific type of envi-
ronmental performance: wastewater discharges by facilities in the 
chemical industry that are regulated under the CWA. We choose to fo-
cus on this measure of environmental performance because federal 
and state regulators systematically record both wastewater discharge 
limits, which are critical for calculating the level of compliance or non-
compliance, and actual discharges. We choose the industrial sector of 
chemical and allied products as the focus of our study because it serves 
as an excellent vehicle for examining the efficacy of government inter-
ventions on corporate environmental performance. EPA has demon-
strated a strong interest in this sector,52 and regards one of the subsec-
tors, industrial organics (Standard Industrial Classification or SIC-code 
2869), as a priority industrial sector.53 The chemical industry is respon-
sible for a significant component of the nation’s industrial output and a 
significant portion of all wastewater discharges by facilities subject to 
                                                                                                                      
51 See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000 & Supp. 2005) (authorizing the 
program and governing its operation). 
52 See, e.g., EPA & Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n, EPA-305-R-99-001, EPA/CMA Root Cause 
Analysis Pilot Project: An Industry Survey 3 (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
Compliance/resources/publications/assistance/sectors/rootcauseanalysis.pdf; Office of 
Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, EPA, EPA-305-R-96-002, Chemical Industry 
National Environmental Baseline Report 1990 to 1994, at ES-4 (1997), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/assistance/sectors/chembaselin
e9094.pdf [hereinafter Chemical Industry Baseline Report]. 
53 See, e.g., Paul S. Farber et al., EPA’s Multi-Media Enforcement & Inspection Program, Ker-
ley Ink, Jan. 1999, http://www.kerleyink.com/technology/epas_multi-media_enforcemen. 
html. 
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CWA regulation.54 Nevertheless, the chemical industry is not necessar-
ily representative of all industrial sectors. Indeed, its unique attributes 
contribute to our interest in studying it. Some firms in the chemical 
industry, for example, have demonstrated an interest in promoting pol-
lution reduction and prevention through efforts prompted by the Re-
sponsible Care program, which is a voluntary management initiative 
supported by the American Chemical Council.55
 Finally, our study focuses on discharges of the pollutant most 
common to regulated facilities—total suspended solids (TSS)56— 
thereby maximizing the number of facilities for which data on wastewa-
ter discharge levels are available, while avoiding the need to combine 
potentially disparate measures of pollution. We examine an adjusted 
measure of TSS discharges, in which each level of discharge is scaled 
relative to its relevant TSS-specific effluent limit; we denote the result-
ing measure as relative discharges. Given our focus on compliance, this 
adjustment with respect to the effluent limit is needed since the level of 
the effluent limit varies across facilities and varies over time for several 
facilities in the sample. TSS-related discharges represent a comprehen-
sive measure of environmental performance because they capture the 
full extent of both noncompliance and over-compliance. This latter 
dimension is important since the sample reveals a strong prevalence of 
substantial over-compliance. 
                                                                                                                      
54 See, e.g., James L. Beebe, Inherently Safer Technology: The Cure for Chemical Plants Which 
Are Dangerous by Design, 28 Hous. J. Int’l L. 239, 242 (2006) (stating that the chemical 
industry in the United States “is a $450 billion business, one of the largest sectors in the 
economy,” and that “the more than 66,000 chemical facilities across the nation employ 
more than one million workers”); cf. James T. Hamilton, Is the Toxic Release Inventory News to 
Investors?, 16 Nat. Resources & Env't 292, 294 (2001) (finding that the chemical industry 
was responsible for more than half of the toxic releases reported as part of the Toxic Re-
lease Inventory in 1989). 
55 See Dow, Our Commitments, Responsible Care, http://www.dow.com/commitments/ 
care (last visited Apr. 30, 2008) (describing Responsible Care as “a voluntary initiative within 
the global chemical industry to safely handle our products from inception in the research 
laboratory, through manufacture and distribution, to ultimate disposal, and to involve the 
public in our decision-making processes”); see also Chemical Industry Baseline Report, 
supra note 52, at 58 (providing examples of environmental initiatives sponsored by trade 
associations and industries). 
56 See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(4) (2000) (describing conven-
tional pollutants, including TSS). Conventional pollutants have been the focus of EPA’s 
control efforts. See Glicksman & Earnhart, supra note 18, at 324 n.20. 
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B. Selection of Sample 
 To examine the effectiveness of government interventions at in-
ducing better environmental performance—lower relative discharges— 
from facilities in the chemical industry, we examine wastewater dis-
charges by the 499 major chemical manufacturing facilities operating 
across the United States during the years 1995 to 2001. We choose ma-
jor facilities for several reasons. First, EPA focuses its regulatory efforts 
on facilities that it classifies as major—in other words, those that either 
possess a discharge flow of one million gallons per day or that cause a 
significant impact on the receiving waterbody.57 According to one 
source, “The distinction between a major and minor permit is of criti-
cal importance because it has a direct impact on the subsequent en-
forcement process. Enforcement priority is given to major permittees, 
meaning that NPDES personnel generally act first on major permit-
tees.”58 Second, EPA’s Permit Compliance System (PCS) database only 
systematically records wastewater discharges and effluent limits for ma-
jor facilities in the NPDES program. Information on wastewater dis-
charge levels is unavailable in any reasonably accessible form for minor 
facilities. Third, the 499 major facilities represented 20.1% of the 2,481 
chemical facilities in the NPDES program in 2001. Moreover, they rep-
resented the bulk of wastewater discharges from this sector. The results 
from this sample of facilities, therefore, should be strongly representa-
tive of the chemical industry as far as pollution control is concerned. 
C. Data Collection 
 To examine the effectiveness of government interventions on the 
environmental performance of U.S. chemical manufacturing facili-
ties, we gather data from various databases maintained by federal and 
state environmental agencies and private entities. The PCS database 
                                                                                                                      
57 See Marilyn Lee Nardo, Feedlots—Rural America’s Sewer, 6 Animal L. 83, 98 (2000); see 
also Susan Hunter & Richard W. Waterman, Enforcing the Law: The Case of the 
Clean Water Acts 36 (1996) (“The main distinction between [major and minor] permits 
involves the amount of water discharged into nearby waters.”). But cf. Definitions, 40 C.F.R. 
§ 122.2 (2007) (defining “major facility” as “any NPDES ‘facility or activity’ classified as 
such by the Regional Administrator, or, in the case of ‘approved State programs,’ the Re-
gional Administrator in conjunction with the State Director”). There are far fewer major 
facilities than minor facilities that are subject to effluent limits under the CWA. As of Janu-
ary 1999, for example, there were 6749 major facilities with NPDES permits and 82,560 
minor facilities. David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a “Reinvented” 
State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 
56 (2000). 
58 Hunter & Waterman, supra note 57, at 36. 
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maintained by EPA provides information about effluent limits appli-
cable to individual facilities under NPDES permits as well as amounts 
actually discharged by those facilities.59 The PCS database also in-
cludes data on inspections performed by federal and state regula-
tors.60 Both the PCS and EPA Docket databases include data on fed-
eral fines imposed by federal administrative agencies and courts. In 
addition, the EPA Docket database includes data on federal injunctive 
relief sanctions and supplemental environmental projects (SEPs).61 
Our study integrates these two databases. 
                                                                                                                      
59 Our data collection process focused on certain information within this database. Fa-
cilities monitor their discharge levels and facility-specific effluent limits and restrict dis-
charges according to two pollution measures: monthly average and monthly maximum. 
Both conversations with government officials and EPA’s definition of SNC, however, sug-
gest that regulators especially care about the average limit. See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Account-
ing Office, GAO/RCED-96-23, Water Pollution: Many Violations Have Not Re-
ceived Appropriate Enforcement Attention 3 (1996), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
archive/1996/rc96023.pdf. 
 According to the EPA, SNC is “not regulatory,” but is used by the agency 
“solely for management purposes and contains those instances of noncompli-
ance . . . that EPA feels merit special attention from NPDES administering 
agencies. These priority violations are tracked through the Strategic Planning 
and Management System (SPMS) to ensure timely enforcement.” 
Glicksman & Earnhart, supra note 18, at 327 n.31 (quoting Office of Water, EPA, The 
Enforcement Management System: National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System, ch. VII, pt. B, at iv (1989)). Further, facilities may monitor discharge levels and 
facility-specific effluent limits, and may restrict only quantities, only concentrations, or 
both. By focusing on compliance levels, our study is able to compare across all facilities 
regardless of the form of their discharge measurement and effluent limit. The analysis 
calculates relative discharges—the ratio of absolute discharges and effluent limits—
regardless of the type of discharge and limit. If both quantity and concentration limits 
apply, the analysis calculates the mean level of compliance. 
60 The PCS database provides the following data elements for each permitted chemical 
facility: (1) permit issuance dates; (2) type of discharge limit: initial, interim, or final; (3) 
indication of changes to a permit during the current five-year issuance period; (4) monthly 
wastewater flow in millions of gallons per day; (5) TSS monthly discharge limits; (6) TSS 
monthly discharges; (7) four-digit SIC-code; and (8) location. 
61 Rechtschaffen & Markell, supra note 19, at 65 (“SEPs are ‘environmentally bene-
ficial projects which a defendant/respondent agrees to undertake in settlement of an en-
forcement action, but which the defendant is not otherwise legally obligated to perform.’” 
(quoting EPA, Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy 79 (1998))); see also Ste-
ven Bonorris et al., Environmental Enforcement in the Fifty States: The Promise and Pitfalls of 
Supplemental Environmental Projects, 11 Hastings W.-Nw. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 185, 187 
(2005) (describing SEPs as “environmentally beneficial projects voluntarily undertaken by 
violators of environmental laws, for which EPA may partially mitigate the civil penalties 
they would otherwise face”). 
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D. Selection of Sample: Revisited 
 The broadest sample of facilities includes all major chemical facili-
ties for all months across the entire sample period: January 1995 to Oc-
tober 2001. This sample includes 499 facilities that were active at some 
point during the sample period. Even though most major chemical fa-
cilities discharge TSS, some do not. To remain in the sample, a given 
facility must have discharged TSS at least once during the seven-year 
sample period. Based on this restriction, the sample drops to 475 facili-
ties. Moreover, not all facilities discharging TSS possess a permit that 
imposes an effluent limit on this specific pollutant. Given the focus on 
compliance level as a measure of environmental performance, to re-
main in the sample, a given facility must have been subject to an efflu-
ent limit for the relevant pollutant in the particular month of dis-
charge.62
III. Statistical Analysis of Collected Data and  
Interpretation of Analytical Results 
 In this Part, we describe the statistical analysis of the collected data 
described in Part II above and interpret the results of our statistical 
analysis. We first describe the statistical methods used to analyze the 
data and the two forms of deterrence—specific and general—in which 
we are interested, as well as explain the interactions between govern-
ment interventions and facility features. The second subsection sum-
marizes the results of our analyses, providing a description of whether 
particular facility or firm features had a positive or negative influence 
on the deterrent effect of various government interventions. 
A. Statistical Analysis 
 We seek to gauge the effectiveness of various government inter-
ventions using multivariate regressions, which attempt to isolate and 
identify the effects of government interventions on the level of waste-
water discharges relative to the facility-specific effluent limit. By em-
ploying regression analysis, we are able to assess the specific and gen-
                                                                                                                      
62 See Dietrich Earnhart, Donald Haider-Markel, Tatsui Ebihara & Robert 
Glicksman, Shaping Corporate Environmental Behavior and Performance: The 
Impact of Enforcement and Non-Enforcement Tools § 5.2 (2006), available at http:// 
www.ipsr.ku.edu/CEP/EPA/finalreport.pdf (providing a more complete description of the 
data collection process). This report also includes a full description of the statistical ap-
proach used to analyze the effects of government interventions on environmental per-
formance. See id. § 5.3. 
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eral deterrent effects of various interventions on TSS discharges rela-
tive to permit limits. Moreover, we wish to assess whether these specific 
and general deterrent effects depend on the features of the facilities 
discharging the TSS-related wastewater. In particular, we assess whether 
the effectiveness of government interventions depends on permit con-
ditions, including permitted effluent limit level, permit limit type, and 
the presence of a permit modification; facility size as measured by flow 
design capacity; capacity utilization as measured by the flow-to-flow ca-
pacity ratio; discharge volatility; or ownership structure. While most of 
these features apply to specific facilities, ownership structure is not a 
facility-level characteristic. Instead, ownership structure represents a 
firm-level characteristic. Nevertheless, we describe the set of features as 
facility features as a matter of convenience. 
 Our study measures deterrence in two forms: specific deterrence 
and general deterrence. First, consider inspection-related deterrence. 
Our study measures inspection-related specific deterrence as the count 
of inspections completed at a specific facility in the preceding twelve-
month period. In a parallel fashion, our study measures inspection-
related general deterrence as the count of inspections completed at all 
other similar facilities, divided by the number of all other similar facili-
ties. By considering inspections at other facilities, the general deter-
rence measure does not overlap with the specific deterrence measure. 
In this way, the general deterrence measure is more likely to reflect the 
facility’s perceived threat of an inspection independent of its own re-
cent experience with inspections. The analysis generates two separate 
regressors for each type of inspection-related deterrence. One regres-
sor reflects only state inspections, while the other regressor reflects only 
federal inspections. In total, the analysis generates and utilizes four re-
gressors related to inspections. 
 Second, consider sanction-related deterrence. Our study measures 
sanction-related specific deterrence as the sum of sanctions—measured 
in dollars—imposed against a specific facility in the preceding twelve-
month period. In a parallel fashion to the inspection-related analysis, 
our study measures sanction-related general deterrence as the sum of 
sanctions—measured in dollars—imposed against other similar facilities, 
divided by the number of other similar facilities. The resulting measure 
represents the unconditional average sanction amount imposed against 
other similar facilities. The analysis generates two separate regressors 
for each type of sanction-related deterrence. One regressor reflects 
only administrative sanctions, while the other regressor reflects only 
civil sanctions. In total, the analysis generates and utilizes four regres-
sors related to sanctions. 
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 In order to appreciate whether the effectiveness of these various 
deterrence measures depends on facility features, our study interacts 
the various measures of specific and general deterrence with various 
facility features. Our analysis creates the interactions between the inter-
vention measures and facility features by multiplying each deterrence 
type with each feature. The resulting product is denoted as an interac-
tion term. For example, to create the interaction term involving state 
inspection-related specific deterrence and the effluent limit level, de-
noted as C, we multiply the regressor that captures state inspection-
related specific deterrence, denoted as A, and the regressor that cap-
tures the effluent limit level, denoted as B. Thus, C = A´B. After creat-
ing these interaction terms, we include these interactions as regressors 
in our estimation of TSS-relative discharges. These interactions help to 
indicate whether different types of facilities or facilities facing different 
corporate conditions respond differently to government interventions. 
In other words, the analysis tests whether the effects of deterrence dif-
fer according to facility features. To test for these differences, the analy-
sis assesses whether the coefficients on the interactive terms are signifi-
cantly different from zero, as described in more depth below. 
 Due to insufficient variation, the analysis is not able to estimate 
certain interactions. For administrative sanction-related specific deter-
rence, our analysis cannot estimate interactions with limit type and 
permit modification. The lack of variation is not surprising since most 
facilities face a final limit type and hold a permit that lacks modifica-
tion. The lack of variation indicates that no administrative sanctions 
were imposed against facilities facing initial or interim limits and no 
administrative sanctions were imposed against facilities possessing per-
mits lacking modification. For civil sanction-related specific deterrence, 
our analysis cannot estimate interactions with limit type, permit modifi-
cation, and ownership structure. Again, the lack of variation for limit 
type and permit modification is not surprising. Even though facilities 
owned by privately held firms represent over thirty percent of the sam-
ple, civil sanctions are sufficiently infrequent that the lack of variation 
for the interaction between civil sanctions and publicly held ownership 
structure is not surprising. 
 Table 1 reports the estimation results for the interaction terms re-
lating to facility features.63 We do not report the actual coefficient 
                                                                                                                      
 
63 Each facility in our sample is represented by multiple observations in the dataset 
used for multivariate regression. This feature of the data structure implies that the dataset 
is actually a panel dataset, that is, the dataset extends across both facilities and time. Three 
primary regression estimators address this data structural feature: pooled ordinary least 
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magnitude estimates along with their associated standard errors. In-
stead, Table 1 simply indicates whether or not a particular interaction is 
statistically at significance levels at or below accepted levels, for exam-
ple, a ten percent significant level. We assess statistical significance 
based on the p-value associated with the t-test of whether the null hy-
pothesis of a zero coefficient magnitude can be rejected. In Table 1, a 
zero (0) indicates a statistically insignificant coefficient, regardless of 
the sign of the coefficient. A plus sign (+) indicates a positive statisti-
cally significant coefficient, while a minus sign (–) indicates a negative 
statistically significant coefficient. 
Table 1: Interactions between government interventions and facility features based 










Facility Characteristic  
Interacted with Government 
Interventions 
SD GD SD GD SD GD SD GD 
 Effluent Limit Level 0 + + – + + 0 + 
 Final Limit Type 0 0 0 – N/A 0 N/A + 
 Permit Modification 0 – + 0 N/A – N/A – 
 Facility Size 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 – 
 Capacity Utilization + – 0 0 0 + 0 0 
 Discharge Volatility – + – + 0 + + 0 
 Publicly Held Ownership 0 + 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 
 SD = specific deterrence 
 GD = general deterrence 
 “0” indicates a statistically insignificant interaction (p>0.10) 
 “+” indicates a positive, statistically significant interaction (p0.10) 
 “–” indicates a negative, statistically significant interaction (p0.10) 
 “N/A” indicates that the interaction term lacks variation in the sample 
B. Interpretation of Interactions Between Interventions and Facility Features 
 In this subsection, we examine the interactions between interven-
tions and facility features. We assess whether the deterrent effects of 
government interventions depend on features of facilities in the 
chemical manufacturing industry. For the purposes of interpretation, a 
positively signed interaction indicates a positive connection between a 
particular deterrent effect and a given characteristic. A positively signed 
                                                                                                                      
squares (OLS) estimator, fixed effects estimator, and random effects estimator. We use two 
tests to identify the best estimator from this set. Based on an F-test of facility-specific fixed 
effects, the fixed effects estimator dominates the pooled OLS estimator. Based on a Haus-
man test of random effects, the fixed effects estimator dominates the random effects esti-
mator. Thus, the fixed effects estimator is best. Accordingly, the analysis focuses on results 
generated by the fixed effects estimator. 
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interaction is recorded as a plus sign in Table 1, indicating that the 
relevant coefficient sign is positive and the associated p-value lies at or 
below ten percent. This positive connection in turn indicates that the par-
ticular deterrent is less effective at inducing better environmental performance 
when the given characteristic is relevant or greater in magnitude. In 
other words, a positive interaction indicates that the particular deter-
rence type generates a more positive, or less negative, effect on relative 
discharges when the given characteristic is relevant or greater in magni-
tude. A deterrence type is effective at inducing better environmental 
performance when it drives down the level of relative discharges, which 
implies a negative effect. Obviously, a less negative effect implies less 
success at inducing lower relative discharge levels. Conversely, a nega-
tively signed interaction indicates a negative connection between a par-
ticular deterrent effect and a given characteristic, which in turn indi-
cates that the particular deterrent is more effective at inducing better 
environmental performance when the given characteristic is relevant or 
greater in magnitude. Such a negatively signed interaction is recorded 
as a minus sign in Table 1, indicating that the relevant coefficient sign 
is negative and the associated p-value lies at or below ten percent. 
 When assessing interactions between interventions and facility fea-
tures, we examine whether the effectiveness of government interven-
tions depends on permit conditions, facility size, capacity utilization, 
discharge volatility, or ownership structure. From this perspective, we 
assess each type of intervention-related deterrence in turn. For each 
deterrence type, we analyze whether its effectiveness depends on any of 
the identified facility features. For example, we may find that the effec-
tiveness of state inspection-related specific deterrence depends on ef-
fluent limit level and facility size. In particular, we may find that this 
effectiveness is enhanced by higher effluent limit levels, yet under-
mined by greater facility size. 
 We first assess the interactions relating to federal inspections. First, 
consider federal inspection-related specific deterrence. The effect of 
federal inspection-related specific deterrence is positively influenced by 
increases in the flow-to-flow capacity ratio. Thus, a facility utilizing a 
greater share of its flow capacity responds less strongly to the comple-
tion of federal inspections at its own facility. In other words, actual fed-
eral inspections are less effective against facilities pushing their waste-
water treatment systems more greatly, as expected. Second, the effect of 
federal inspection-related specific deterrence is negatively influenced 
by increases in discharge volatility. Thus, a facility facing greater volatil-
ity responds more strongly to the completion of federal inspections at 
its own facility, as expected. 
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 Next, consider federal inspection-related general deterrence. First, 
the effect of federal inspection-related general deterrence is positively 
influenced by increases in the effluent limit level. Thus, facilities facing 
higher—meaning less stringent—effluent limits respond less strongly to 
the threat of federal inspections against facilities in general, contrary to 
our expectation. Second, the effect of federal inspection-related gen-
eral deterrence is positively influenced by the presence of a permit 
modification. Thus, facilities enjoying a modification to their permit 
respond more strongly to the threat of federal inspections, consistent 
with our primary expectation. Third, contrary to specific deterrence, 
the effect of federal inspection-related general deterrence is negatively 
influenced by increases in the flow-to-flow capacity ratio. Thus, facilities 
utilizing a greater share of their flow capacity respond more strongly to 
the threat of federal inspections, contrary to our expectation. Fourth, 
in contrast to specific deterrence, the effect of federal inspection-
related general deterrence is positively influenced by increases in dis-
charge volatility. Thus, facilities facing greater volatility respond less 
strongly to the threat of federal inspections, contrary to our expecta-
tion. Fifth, the effect of federal inspection-related general deterrence is 
positively influenced by the presence of publicly held ownership. Thus, 
facilities owned by publicly held firms respond less strongly to the 
threat of federal inspections than do facilities owned by privately held 
firms. 
 We next assess interactions relating to state inspections. Initially, 
consider state inspection-related specific deterrence. The effect of 
state inspection-related specific deterrence is positively influenced by 
increases in the effluent limit level. Thus, a facility facing a higher— 
meaning less stringent—effluent limit responds less strongly to the 
completion of state inspections at its own facility, contrary to our ex-
pectation. Second, the effect of state inspection-related specific deter-
rence is positively influenced by the presence of a permit modifica-
tion. Thus, a facility enjoying a modification to its permit responds 
less strongly to the completion of state inspections at its own facility, 
contrary to our primary expectation, but consistent with the notion 
that facilities perceive modifications as signals of greater future regu-
latory flexibility. Third, similar to federal inspection-related specific 
deterrence, the effect of state inspection-related specific deterrence is 
negatively influenced by increases in discharge volatility. Thus, a facil-
ity facing greater volatility responds more strongly to the completion 
of state inspections at its own facility, as expected. 
 Next, consider state inspection-related general deterrence. First, 
the effect of state inspection-related general deterrence is negatively 
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influenced by increases in the effluent limit level. Thus, facilities facing 
higher effluent limits respond more strongly to the threat of state in-
spections against facilities in general, as expected. Second, the effect of 
federal inspection-related general deterrence is negatively influenced 
by the presence of a final limit type. Thus, facilities facing final limits 
respond more strongly to the threat of state inspections, as expected. 
Third, similar to federal inspection-related general deterrence, the ef-
fect of state inspection-related general deterrence is positively influ-
enced by increases in discharge volatility. Thus, facilities facing greater 
volatility respond less strongly to the threat of state inspections, con-
trary to our expectation. 
 Next, we assess interactions relating to federal administrative sanc-
tions.64 Consider administrative sanction-related specific deterrence. 
The effect of administrative sanction-related specific deterrence is posi-
tively influenced by increases in the effluent limit level. Thus, a facility 
facing a higher effluent limit responds less strongly to the imposition of 
administrative sanctions at its own facility, contrary to our expectation. 
 We also consider administrative sanction-related general deter-
rence. First, the effect of administrative sanction-related general deter-
rence is positively influenced by increases in the effluent limit level. 
Thus, facilities facing higher effluent limits respond less strongly to the 
threat of administrative sanctions imposed against facilities in general, 
contrary to our expectation. Second, the effect of administrative sanc-
tion-related general deterrence is negatively influenced by the presence 
of a permit modification. Thus, facilities enjoying a modification to 
their permits respond more strongly to the threat of administrative 
sanctions, consistent with our primary expectation. Third, the effect of 
administrative sanction-related general deterrence is positively influ-
enced by increases in the flow-to-flow capacity ratio. Thus, facilities util-
izing a greater share of their flow capacity respond less strongly to the 
threat of administrative sanctions, as expected. Fourth, the effect of 
administrative sanction-related general deterrence is positively influ-
enced by increases in discharge volatility. Thus, facilities facing greater 
volatility respond less strongly to the threat of administrative sanctions, 
contrary to our expectation. 
 We also assess interactions relating to federal civil sanctions. First, 
consider civil sanction-related specific deterrence. The effect of civil 
                                                                                                                      
64 For purposes of this analysis, sanctions include judicial or administrative penalty as-
sessment proceedings, the imposition of injunctive relief in court, and the imposition of 
SEPs approved by a court. 
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sanction-related specific deterrence is positively influenced by increases 
in discharge volatility. Thus, a facility facing greater volatility responds 
less strongly to the imposition of civil sanctions at its own facility, con-
trary to our expectation. 
 Finally, consider civil sanction-related general deterrence. First, 
similar to administrative sanctions, the effect of civil sanction-related 
general deterrence is positively influenced by increases in the effluent 
limit level. Thus, facilities facing higher effluent limits respond less 
strongly to the threat of civil sanctions imposed against facilities in gen-
eral, contrary to our expectation. Second, the effect of civil sanction-
related general deterrence is negatively influenced by the presence of a 
final limit type. Thus, facilities facing final limits respond less strongly 
to the threat of civil sanctions, contrary to our expectation. Third, the 
effect of civil sanction-related general deterrence is negatively influ-
enced by the presence of a permit modification. Thus, facilities enjoy-
ing a modification to their permit respond more strongly to the threat 
of civil sanctions, consistent with our primary expectation. Fourth, the 
effect of civil sanction-related general deterrence is negatively influ-
enced by increases in flow capacity. Thus, larger facilities, as measured 
by their flow capacity, respond more strongly to the threat of civil sanc-
tions, consistent with our primary expectation. 
Conclusion 
 If the noncompliance figures cited at the beginning of this Arti-
cle65 are indicative of larger trends in environmental compliance status, 
both under the federal CWA and elsewhere, the federal and state gov-
ernments seem to have much to learn about how to go about inducing 
regulated entities to improve their environmental performance track 
records. The empirical work described in this Article is designed to 
provide insights into the influence of seven particular facility and firm 
features on the effectiveness of government interventions at improving 
environmental performance of major facilities in the chemical industry 
regulated under the CWA. 
 In some instances, our findings correspond to the expectations 
generated by our analysis of the theoretical literature and previous em-
pirical studies on environmental performance and compliance. We ex-
pected to find, for example, that interventions directed at facilities with 
a great deal of volatility in discharge levels would improve perform-
                                                                                                                      
65 See supra notes 6–15 and accompanying text. 
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ance, by reducing discharges relative to permitted levels, more than 
interventions directed at facilities with less volatility. We found that a 
facility facing greater volatility responds more strongly to both federal 
and state inspections at its own facility. Other findings confound our 
expectations. The general deterrent effect of both federal and state 
inspections was weaker, for example, at facilities with volatile discharges 
than at those not experiencing as much volatility. In still other cases, 
our findings are consistent with one of two or more alternative expecta-
tions we generated, but inconsistent with others. Facilities with permits 
that have been modified respond more strongly to the threat of federal 
inspections, administrative sanctions, and civil sanctions than facilities 
without such modifications. These findings are consistent with the ex-
pectation that the norm of reciprocity will influence facilities whose 
permits have been modified—inducing them to improve perform-
ance—to a greater extent than it will affect firms that have not experi-
enced permit modifications.66 They conflict, however, with the theory 
that facilities with permits that have been modified are less likely to 
take interventions seriously than facilities without modified permits 
because the former may believe that all permit limits are subject to ne-
gotiation. 
 The findings described in Part III do not provide definitive an-
swers to the question of how facility and firm features relate to the ef-
fectiveness of government interventions on environmental perform-
ance. This conclusion is true even with respect to the influence on 
performance by major facilities regulated under the CWA of the seven 
features we choose to study, in part because of the inconclusive nature 
of some of our findings, and in part because data from a different pe-
riod might provide different results. We hope that our study illustrates, 
however, the potential utility to both regulators and regulated entities 
of considering the influence of facility and firm features on environ-
mental performance. Regulators may be able to allocate their en-
forcement resources more effectively if they direct interventions at fa-
cilities with features that make them likely to respond strongly to 
interventions. They may be able to predict what facilities are likely to 
respond to a greater or lesser extent to different kinds of interventions 
and shape their interactions with regulated facilities accordingly. Regu-
lated facilities may be able to assess whether certain features make it 
easier or more difficult for them to improve performance and plan ac-
cordingly. 
                                                                                                                      
66 See discussion supra Part I.A.3. 
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 If our study is to serve as an effective starting point in providing 
these kinds of insights, more work needs to be done to assess the influ-
ence of facility features on environmental performance, both in and 
outside the context of government interventions. Our study can pro-
vide guidance on both the design—by providing examples of the kinds 
of questions to ask—and implementation—by describing the method-
ology we use to answer these questions—of future empirical work. Per-
haps when legislators and agency officials celebrate the CWA’s fiftieth 
anniversary, they will be able to toast high rates of compliance with 
regulatory obligations, instead of ignoring evidence of troublesome 
compliance figures. 
